Wednesday, June 11, 2008
I was emailed an article about how the internet changes the way we read and think. The author, Nicholas Carr, credits Maryanne Wolf with the idea that deep reading is indistinguishable from deep thinking. I yahooed Wolf and found that she took part in an interesting radio discussion which I'm listening to now. Hmm. I am optimistic about thinking with the net.
Labels: blogging, Maryanne Wolf, reading, thinking
Thursday, January 17, 2008
Merleau-Ponty describes Descartes' Cogito ergo sum as the "Open Sesame!" of fundamental thought. Fundamental, Merleau-Ponty says, "because it is not borne by anything, but not fundamental as if with it one reached a foundation upon which one ought to base oneself and stay. As a matter of principle, fundamental thought is bottomless. It is, if you wish, an abyss" (Signs, "Introduction," p. 21). The never stand still of the self corresponds to a never stand still of being. Merleau-Ponty asserts that "the world and Being hold together only in movement; it is only in this way that all things can be together" (p. 22). Should we want all things to be together? Is there an incestuous impulse beneath Merleau-Ponty's chiasma of the flesh, or beneath the discussion of Being in general? What role do boundaries play in Thinking? The role of dramaturge? Does the never stand still have its Open Sesame in stillness, its point zero, as Kojima might suggest it must have; is there a chiasmus of the never stand still?
Let's spend a moment with the idea of the abyss. The abyss, Merleau-Ponty assures us, is not nothing. Here is some context:
Now as before, philosophy begins with a "What is thinking?" and is absorbed in the question to begin with. No instruments or organs here. It is a pure "It seems to me that." He whom all things appear before cannot be hidden from himself. He appears to himself first of all. He is this appearance of self to self. He springs forth from nothing; no thing and no one can stop him from being himself, or help him. He always was, he is everywhere, he is king on his desert island.
But the first truth can only be a half-truth. It opens upon something different. There would be nothing if there were not that abyss of self. But an abyss is not nothing; it has environs and edges. One always thinks of something; about, according to, in the light of something; with regard to, in contact with something. Even the action of thinking is caught up in the push and shove of being. I cannot think of identically the same thing for more than an instant. The opening is in principle immediately filled, as if lived only in a nascent state.
(p. 14)
Thinking takes place in contactis this a half-truth? What sort of contact? Merleau-Ponty, in an almost Jamesian masculine voice, speaks of the push and shove of being. The masculine persona can only ever be half the storyand not even that. Who will speak for the caress of being? Who will speak for the soft contours of the abyss?
It seems to me that thinking is not an abyss, but is urgently in contact with the abyss. Yet what does thinking know of contact? Who taught it to touch? Has thinking always known contact and only been taught to forget, only learned to remember? Con-tact, the dictionary assures us, is mutual. It is the state or condition of touching, of two bodies touching each other. Can there be contact without boundaries? If I recognize the paper of my copy of Signs as flesh, what boundary is there between this flesh and my flesh? The book is the flesh of whose world?
The urgency of thinking is this: not to be borne but to be in contact with the abyss. I dream I walk on air and every step is a wonder. It is a recurring dream, as I may have mentioned before, yet still every step is a wonder. Merleau-Ponty struggles with repetition as anybody who thinks urgently must, although perhaps he imagines his struggle is with the identical. Can he for an instant think of identically the same thing? For an instant? For an instant? The instant is always at the back of thinking, the opening of the never stand stillLook, you're gliding over the abyss! The instant is not the vertical, though it has its leanings. It will not be repeated.
I receive these words as prophecy:
To make of language a means or a code for thought is to break it. When we do so we prohibit ourselves from understanding the depth to which words sound within usfrom understanding that we have a need, a passion, for speaking and must (as soon as we think) speak to ourselves; that words have power to arouse thoughts and implant henceforth inalienable dimensions of thought; and that they put responses on our lips we did not know we were capable of, teaching us, Sartre says, our own thought.
(p. 17)
Labels: abyss, body, intentionality, language, Merleau-Ponty, motility, ontology, thinking, touch
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
It must be thought that thought doesn't exist. I don't mean to engage in facile skepticism or to recycle a materialist propostion that thoughts aren't really real. Rather I mean to question whether the activity of thinking is autonomous, whether it has anything to do with something called thought, and if it does, whether thought can mean what we want it to mean.
If thinking exists it exists as a metapractice. Any practice can potentially be a metapracticereflective, abstract, critical, metaphoric, and yet no less a practice. No one field of practice is privileged in its metapractical function. Thinking is no more or less critical of cultivation than cooking is, for example. Secondary technical elaborations of practice can also take on a metapractical function, like paths between fields.
That thinking exists as an autonomous practice, however, may be iffy. What we call thinking may in fact be expression, calculation, composition, engineering, experimentation or the like, as the case may be. Perhaps no practice is completely autonomous, and we set the bar too high for thinking if we ask that it be autonomous. Does the idea of thinking as such require that we recognize an autonomy of thinking? The question of whether thinking is autonomous should not to be confused with the question of whether thinking must be about something. It's a matter of being able to recognize thinking for what it is, if that's possible.
We can generalize. Can generalization be decoupled from expression, calculation, composition, engineering, experimentation and the like? Do we believe our generalizations? This latter question should not be interpreted as assuming that thoughts aren't really real. It's a question that asks that we not make an assumption one way or the other. Perhaps our generalizations are intended to be hypothetical (or hypnothetical). If thinking is a passage, a bridge or a tunnel, it becomes a passage with an other side as a result of a decision. Stand on a bridge without deciding on a direction to take. Sooner or later the thought might arise that standing there thinking is a waste of a perfectly good bridge. Sooner or later we may decide to believe in our generalizations in order for the passage of thought to be a passage. In so doing, paradoxically, thought becomes something other than what it is, becomes a means to some other end.
Thinking may be a practice, and thought may exist. Thought engaged in a course of action may be no more or less real than thought apart from a decided upon course of action. Such indecisive thoughts, however, may not be the "products" of an activity of thinking, and not really a structure of thinking either. They fleet. We must consider whether there is a difference between thought as a metapractical field and thought such as it is. Since each may call for the other, we must also consider whether there's something like thought that bridges the two. I believe there's an aporia in there somewhere, but I will have to give it some thought.
Labels: thinking
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
Common sense tells us that of course the world can be thought. In the phenomenology of Renaud Barbaras, however, the question of whether the world can be thought is not so simply settled. To begin with, let's take a look at the conclusions Barbaras draws from his chapter on "living movement," which includes an incisive consideration of Bergson's Matter and Memory:
One cannot reintroduce in the subject a specific dimension by which it would relate to the totality as such, an ability to dominate the world and to determine it adequatelyin short, something like a thought; on the contrary, it is with regard to such an approach (which is still Husserl's) that Bergson's analysis demonstrates its value. Insofar as it all-encompassing, the world is essentially what can neither be dominated nor adequately given, which is why it disappears from everything that manifests it. The negative character of manifestation is the correlative of the unpresentability of the world. It is therefore through living movement that we must grasp in a unitary way the possibility of the manifestation and that of the comanifestation of the world it negates; we can account for perception that is based on movement only on the condition of elucidating a sense of being proper to the motor subject in which are constituted conjointly the manifestation and the totality of which the manifestation is the negation. Moreover, to the degree that, as motor, the subject can circumscribe its object only within the phenomenal field and to the degree that the manifestation of the phenomenal totality as such cannot rely on a nonvital (extraworldly) dimension, we must conclude from this that the movement from which perception proceeds constitutes totality in the act by which it negates it and therefore that there is a positing of totality only as its own negation. We are not asserting here the view that totality is given only in forms in which it is negated, but rather that it is in its negation that the totality as such is posited, as if the part were to give rise to the whole of which it is a part. The perceiving subject is defined by the fact that the movement it unfolds opens onto the totality in the very act by which it negates it by determining it in the form of a concrete manifestation. We find ourselves here midway between Husserl's and Bergson's positions: if perception is indeed a condition of the world, this condition cannot be based on an autonomous psychic order, and it must therefore proceed from vital activity itself, so that it is indeed in movement itself that the world must be constituted, a world that movement considers as the field against the background of which its negating power unfolds.
(Desire and Distance, pp. 105-106)
Thus while the world can be thought, it does not originally appear because it is thought; the world is originally posited as such as the negative pole of a movement toward manifestation, toward something that is percieved. In this view, negation, (perhaps) metonomy, and intentionality are not psychic operations but rather qualities of living movement, actions of the body. Barbaras says that perception is intentional because of its motility, i.e., not because of the intervention of a consciousness that is itself necessarily intentional (p. 101). In no uncertain terms he claims that "perceptual manifestation ultimately arises from the strict relation between a movement and a phenomenal field, and it is by no means necesssary to introduce any psychic reality whatsoever; the properly active moment of perception in which the autonomy of a subjectivity is confirmed resides in motility, which is why perception as such is indifferent to the division between the psychic and the corporeal" (p. 97).
Barbaras makes the case that movement forms part of the essence of perception (p. 89). That's not so difficult to grasp. However, to make his case against the introduction of a psychic reality, his argument depends on the reverse holding true, the idea that perception forms part of the essence of movement. (We've already looked at the problem of linking worldhood directly to motility; Barbaras and Jonas are on similar ground here, both dealing with the philosophy of the living organism and, ultimately, the relationship between movement and desire; and both seem to have a view of living movement that doesn't adequately explain the existence of the amoeba it could be accounted for by a theory of semovience, but there is this problem of determining what is and what isn't psychic.) Barbaras' characterizes (living) movement thusly:
[M]ovement itself refers to the object on the basis of a mode that is irreducible to an objective and mechanical displacement; it is familiar with the objectthere is perception within movement. It does not involve a perception distinct from it that would guide it or subsist in it in an implicit or unconcsious way. Such an interpretation is rooted in an inability to conceive of experience other than on the basis of psychic contents, foreign to the order of exteriority (in other words, in an inability to recognize the autonomy of appearance.) In truth, it is movement itself that perceives in the sense that the object exists for it, in which movement has its meaning, as its oriented nature attests, inspired and clairvoyant with regard to the living movement that often demonstrates an intimacy with its objective, an intimacy that runs deeper than that which knowledge exhibits. In an by movement the object appears, though without its manifestation being separated from its brute presence, according to the indistinctness between its essence and its existence. Here the grasp of the object is not distinguished from the gesture made toward it; perception takes place in the world and not in me, and the object is therefore perceived where it is. We are confronted with a strictly motor perception that unfolds exclusively in exteriority and rejoins rather than represents the object.
(pp. 91-92, Barbaras' emphases)
"Paradoxically," Barbaras says, following Bergson, "to say that image is for me is to say that it is itself, that it is distinguished from the totality" (p. 101). Are we therefore being asked to conceive of the world on the basis of a paradox? These two questions are not unrelated: Is the world as it originally appears the product of a thought, and can the world be thought at all? But if common sense continues to insist that the world can be thought, even on the basis of a paradox, are we not still left with the question of whether or not the world itself is thought? That is, of course, if Barbaras is simply wrong.
Barbaras points to the inexhaustability of perception (an idea we have briefly encountered before), and he links this to movement, to an "excess beyond the self" and to the "infinite excess of ability beyond action" (p. 95). I still maintain a healthy skepticism of the concept of excess (Dyadic Excess), and in this case I am much more inclined to regard movement as prone to exhaustion than thought, if those are indeed the alternatives. I have had experiences of being totally exhausted by thought, and of my thinking being exhausted. Along with the nightmarish prospect that thinking never rests (The Rhythm of Thinking), I must now consider the possibility that the living subject never sleeps nor rests, that it is constantly in movement. Can this really be the meaning of semovience? Well, if it is, then it just may follow that the world is unthinkable in its original form, because it is always at every conceivable moment of experience present before it can be thought. Hmm.
Labels: Barbaras, Bergson, body, Jonas, motility, perception, phenomenology, rest, semovience, thinking, world
Tuesday, February 13, 2007
This is fun:
Once communication between heterogeneous series is established, all sorts of consequences follow within the system. Something 'passes' between the borders, events explode, phenomena flash, like thunder and lightning. Spatio-temporal dynamisms fill the system, expressing simultaneously the resonance of the coupled series and the amplitude of the forced movement which exceeds them. The system is populated by subjects, both larval subjects and passive selves: passive selves because they are indistinguishable from the contemplation of couplings and resonances, larval subjects because they are supports or patients of the dynamisms. In effect, a pure spatio-temporal dynamism, with its necessary participation in the forced movement, can be experienced only at the borders of the livable, under conditions beyond which it would entail the death of any well-constituted subject endowed with independence and activity. Embryology already displays the truth that there are systematic vital movements, tortions and drifts, that only the embryo can sustain: an adult would be torn apart by them. There are movements for which one can only be a patient, but the patient in turn can only be a larva. Evolution does not take place in the open air, and only the involuted evolves. A nightmare is perhaps a psychic dynamism that could be sustained neither awake nor even in dreams, but only in profound sleep, in a dreamless sleep. In this sense, it is not even clear that thought, in so far as it constitutes the dynamism peculiar to philosophical systems, may be related to a substantial, completed and well-constituted subject, such as the Cartesian Cogito: thought is, rather, one of those terrible movements which can be sustained only under the conditions of a larval subject. These systems admit only such subjects as these, since they alone can undertake the forced movement by becoming the patient of the dynamisms which express it. Even the philosopher is a larval subject of his own system. Thus we see that these systems are defined not only by heterogeneous series which border them, nor by the coupling, the resonance and the forced movement which constitute their dimensions, but also by the subjects which populate them and the dynamisms which fill them, and finally by the qualities and extensities which develop on the basis of such dynamisms.
(Difference and Repetition, pp. 118-119).
Is thinking only possible on condition of an endless becoming? I'm not sure what to make of that. I'm not even sure that it makes sense to think of becoming without end. Have I become anything, or have I become many things, many people? I have for example become a blogger. Am I still in the process of becoming a blogger, or am I becoming something else now by blogging, an inveterate blogger perhaps, or a blogger in such and such a style. Isn't is so, though, that I have blogged?
More and more I think about senescence. Naturally, I am growing oldeven the language we use to talk about aging betrays a prejudice towards becoming. Is senescence really a becoming, or is that kind of thinking euphemistic? Why is it so much easier to see natality as part of the human condition than senescence?
Perpetual becoming and endless becoming should be thought of as two different things. Perpetual becoming has its ends; it's just that they are multiple, and becoming can be repeated. Endless becoming is only questionably a becoming.
(Update. I have an obvious prejudice against fantasy. Is this purely a moralistic position, or do I have some reason to believe that the fantastic can be transcended, and that this transcendence is, like fantasy, part of the human condition? Would I really want to live in a world without fantasy?)
At the end of the day my image of thought will differ from Deleuze's. He says that "in fact men think rarely, and more often under the impulse of a shock than in the excitement of a taste for thinking" (p. 132). I think people are constantly immersed in thought. Thought is steeped in the regularities of daily life. If much of this thought doesn't appear to be philosophical, I'm not sure that isn't a problem for philosophy rather than a problem with the way people think.
Labels: Deleuze, larval subjects, natality, senescence, thinking
Thursday, November 30, 2006
I checked out Isabelle Stengers' Power and Invention. I'm not sure exaclty why it appeals to me. Maybe it has something to do with the phenomenon of the strange attractor, the attractor that lacks the quality of stability, but instead the system "wanders between possibilities" (Isabelle Stengers, "Complexity: A Fad?" in Invention and Power, p. 7).
I often catch myself falling back on old habits of thought. Is this an attempt to maintain equilibrium? Can it be that simple? Say thinking does tend towards equilibrium. Why then doesn't thinking just stop? Is existence so disturbing to thought that it simply cannot rest?
How long does it take for the system called thinking to evolve, to reach its attractor?
Is a habit of thinking like repeating a single thought ad infinitum, or is it ever more productive than that? Can't we make habits of ways of disturbing our own equilibria? Can we say that's true and still say that thinking tends towards equilibrium? Whose equilibrium? Is there any reason to believe that thinking tends towards the equilibrium (or disequilibrium) of a thinking ego? Who owns the system called thinking?
Labels: Stengers, strange attractor, thinking
Monday, November 06, 2006
"Being prepared to recieve what thought is not prepared to think is what deserves the name thinking," Lyotard writes ("Time Today," in The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, p. 73). If we define thinking this way, as an openness to the event, Lyotard says it follows that the thinker is "ipso facto in a position of resistance to the procedures for controlling time" (p. 74). Lyotard follows this unusual statement with a more conventional restatement of what it means to think: "To think is to question everything, including thought, and question, and the process" (p. 74).
Does thought have the character of an occurrence? I can surely think of it that way, but, as they say, thinking doesn't make it so. To question questioning, isn't that an activity that presupposes more than one occurrence, i.e. the question and the answer? Even if the answer is glacially slow in coming, or so slow that it never quite arrives, hasn't its arrival already been anticipated by thinking in the mode of questioning? So should we say that thought has the character of relating to or between occurrences rather than itself being an occurrence? Yet isn't thinking still like an occurrence, something that goes on?
Lyotard, ever concerned with negentropy, puts forward as a consequence of logical positivism this idea: "the real 'user' of language is not the human mind qua human, but complexity in movement, of which mind is only a transitory support" (p. 72). Once the thought has occurred, is there not an obligation to resist? What then would be the source of this feeling that one ought not be alienated from one's thinking?
In music is there such a thing as playing the right note at the wrong time? I tend toward the opinion that there is no such thing, that timing is everything, and at the wrong time one can only play wrong notes. But how much of a delay are we able to accept, in music or in thinking? That I think must be open-ended, impossible to determine in advance. Does one have a sense of rhythm about thoughts one is not prepared to think? What sort of phenomenon would this be?
Labels: Lyotard, rhythm, thinking
Wednesday, November 01, 2006
Arendt renders the third fragment of Parmenides (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι) as "To be and to think are the same" (Life of the Mind p. 136). The Burnett translation gives us "For it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be." The Elpenor translation is "The same is thinking and being." Professor Cherubin at George Mason offers "for the same thing is to conceive (be aware) [of] and to be." Although it would be presumptious to say exactly what Parmenides was getting at in this fragment of a line, the equation of being (estin) with thinking (noein) nevertheless invites meditation on the nature of thinking and being.
If thinking is dimly understood, a vague concept at best encompassing a great variety of conscious experiences, the concept of being is downright mysterious. What does it mean finally to say that something is a being or has being? Is a rock a being? Can I deny the being of a rock without denying the reality of a rock? The rock may appear to me as a mere transitional form, something between a boulder and a grain of sand. It is part of a rock cycle. When it doesn't appear to me as a pragma, something that might be useful to some purpose, then I wonder what significance to attach to its present form. I imagine its beginning and its end. I imagine its intimacy with water. In this aspect, I can see the reality of the rock as schematic or ideal. Is being required for the rock to hold this place in reality? Perhaps, but in this case its being would be mediated by consciousness. I wouldn't need to accept the being of the rock outside the realm of the phenomenal in order to acknowledge its reality as a rock.
What about a house plant? A philodendron? Like a rock, the philodendron exists within the earth's great cycles. It photosynthesizes, transpires, consumes nitrogen and so on. Yet the philodendron appears to me more than the rock as being rather uniquely its own thing. The shape of its leaves has adaptive significance, I assume, but I also know that other shapes would also be adaptive, and yet the philodendron produces only philodendron leaves. It seems to be a more refined creature of its history than the rock is. Could that be an illusion due to the vast differences in time scales between the rock cycle and the more superficial cycles the plant is sensitive to? Could it be an effect of syntropy? Why do I want to ascribe some sort of ontic quality to the plant that I am willing to let slide in the case of the rock? Is it because I love the philodendron? Does this cloud my judgement? Do I project an awareness of my own thinking as a living entity onto other objects that also live? I'm not sure that's the case. I may have an awareness of other lives that is not merely a projection of my own awareness of being alive. That would be most evident in the matter of relations with other people, but it may be a way of relating to plants too.
On the flip side, there is the materialist view that would deny the isness of thinking. I don't have any rebuttal against that view, except to say that I'm certain that anybody who can think thoughts don't exist surely does exist. A nuanced materialist critique that would differentiate between the isness of material objects and the (presumably diminished) isness of thinking would strike me as both reasonable and not altogether satisfying.
In sum, although the Burnett translation of Parmenides' third fragment is the odd man out, it appears to have some truth in it, although I'm not convinced it holds up when we examine other lives. By the same token, I'm much more willing to ascribe to being to nonsentient living organisms than I should be if thinking and being were truly identical.
Labels: Arendt, ontology, Parmenides, philodendron, stone, thinking
Sunday, October 22, 2006
Arendt comes down against concluding on the basis of our experience of the noetic faculty, especially in dreams, that there exist things in themesleves which exist in the same way that we exist in a world of appearances (Life of the Mind, Vol. 1,p. 44). She says further:
[E]lementary logical mistakes are quite rare in the history of philosophy; what appear to be errors in logic to minds disencumbered of questions that have been uncritically dismissed as "meaningless" are usually caused by semblances, unavoidable for beings whose existence is determined by appearance. Hence, in our context the only relevant question is whether the semblances are inauthentic or authentic ones, whether they are caused by dogmatic beliefs and arbitrary assumptions, mere mirages that disappear upon closer inspection, or whether they are inherent in the paradoxical condition of a living being that, though itself part of the world of appearances, is in possession of a faculty, the ability to think, that permits the mind to withdraw from the world without ever being able to leave it or transcend it.
(p. 45)
For my part, I don't reckon that the dreaming ego under normal conditions is a good proxy for the thinking ego. I'll definitely be rereading Binswanger's "Dream and Existence" as I wrap my mind around this one.
Labels: Arendt, dreaming, noesis, thinking
Friday, October 20, 2006
In her introduction to Life of the Mind, Hannah Arendt recalls Kant's distinction between Vernunft (reason) and Verstand (the intellect). In a nutshell, she says, "The need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning." (p. 15, emphasis in original). She goes on to say that "[t]he basic metaphysical fallacy, taking precendence over all specific metaphysical fallacies, is to interpret meaning on the model of truth." Hmmm. This whole business of meaning seems a little Twentieth-Century to me. But that's quite a nutshell.
Thinking about the history of thinking the word that readily comes to mind is "imperious." Why start with Western antiquity? Why logos and so on? Must any such inquiry be imperious, or could it be otherwise? Where does Patañjali belong in the history of thinking? What has thinking become since Nāgārjuna? For my part it is convenient to place Eastern thinking after Western thinking simply because that is how the history of thinking has unfolded for me. If my perspective turned out to be founded on an imperial privilege I should want to question that. And if I came to understand my vantage point as merely an historical accident that too would be a problem. How does one genuinely reckon with the plurality of ways of thinking?
The idea that thinking is indeed a historical phenomenon makes a dilemma of the plurality of ways of thinking. We could just abandon it. After all, every human being is capable of thinking. The meaning of historical phenomena, like metaphysical ideas, never seems to be quite fixed. Why burden thinking with such a heavy load? Perhaps because it's inescapable. It may be theoretically possible to think outside any recognizable tradition of thinking, but in actual practice thinkers almost invariably take on the load of tradition. It seems to belong to the nature of thinking to develop historically.
Labels: Arendt, historicity, thinking