Friday, September 04, 2009

Popping in and out of Eternity

Nachmanovitch advises that the creative person distinguish between constructive judgment and obstructive judgment.


This means telling the difference between two kinds of time. The feedback between constructive judgment and ongoing creative work goes back and forth at more than lightning speed: it goes on in no-time (eternity). The partners, muse and editor, are always in synchrony, like a pair of dancers who have known each other for a long time.


(Free Play, p. 134)


Does one simply pop in on eternity? Pop! Has it always been "there," or does it need to be generated through something like practice? Can we judge eternity into and out of existence? Must eternity at any moment have been inspired? Does eternity even have moments?

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posted by Fido the Yak at 9:13 AM. 0 comments

Monday, August 31, 2009

Exarations of an Earthly Self

"Editing must come from the same inspired joy and abandon as free improvisation," says Nachmanovitch (Free Play, , p. 109).


The mYrror between the Olympian and the secretarial, a dionysiac hand exarate. The poet knows things like chiton, stylus, catoptron, morph, amphora. He says such things as if his words were butterflies. The poetical far surpasses the poet, such is the amphoricity of the poet's psyche, the bearing of its epiphanizations. What has been relinquished in order to give out giving? Breath? Earthly Breath.

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posted by Fido the Yak at 3:44 AM. 0 comments

Tuesday, August 25, 2009

Pluripotentiality/Plurifinality

Nachmanovitch says, "Bricolage implies what mathematicians like to call 'elegance,' that is, such an economy of statement that a single line of thought has a great many implications and outcomes" (Free Play, p. 86). Does this line of thought have consequences for our thinking about causality? Are there spheres of play or creativity completely divorced from causality? (And isn't there the argument that suchlike divorce is essential to causality? Is this any less a statement about the given that it is about causality?) As ever it seems I'm uncertain about the ontic status of the cause. Does the cause have many outcomes? Does the cause implicate the way the metaphor implicates—by what rights would one say that metaphor doesn't implicate conversationally? What is the ontic status of a maxim of manner? Should I say *maxim of manner?

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posted by Fido the Yak at 3:09 PM. 0 comments

Interdigitation from Within

Nachmanovitch:


The voice of the muse comes to realization in and through the limits of the body. Look at your hand. Turn it over. Stretch it. Point it. Thump it. For a musician, of all the structures that impose their discipline on us, the most ubiquitous and marvellous is the human hand. Beginning with the fact that the hand has five digits and not six or four, the hand predisposes our work toward particular conformations because it itself has a shape. The kind of music you play on the violin or piano, the kind of painting that comes from your handling of the brush, the pottery you turn on the wheel, is intimately influenced by the shape of your hands, by the way they move, by their resistances. The structure of the hand is not (once again) "just anything"; the fingers have certain characteristic relationships, certain ranges of relative movement, certain kinds of crossing, torquing jumping, sliding, pressing, releasing movements that guide the music to come out in a certain way. Graceful work uses those patterns and instinctively moves through them and out as we find ever-fresh combinations. The shape and size of the human hand brings powerful but subtle laws into every kind of art, craftsmanship, mechanical work, and into our ideas and feelings as well. There is a continuous dialogue between hand and instrument, hand and culture. Artwork is not thought up in consciousness and then, as a separate phase, executed by the hand. The hand surprises us, creates and solves problems on its own. Often enigmas that baffle our brains are dealt with easily, unconsciously, by the hand.


(Free Play, pp. 81-82, my bold)


Terpsichore represents the apotheosis of the muse—the prism through which the full spectrum of musicality becomes spectral—because of this emancipating limitation of the hand. Does improvisation have as a deep structure the morphology of the hand? A human hand? Why not two hands? Is the breach shaped or directed by hands? Are apparition and depth on par, a par shaped by the hands?


Forget propositional knowledge for a moment. Feel your hands from the inside. Does this describe a real feeling: feeling your hands from the inside? Where does "from the inside" find its place in the full spectrum of musicality?

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posted by Fido the Yak at 3:06 PM. 0 comments

Friday, July 17, 2009

Temenos

In discussing the oneness of practice and attainment, Nachmanivotich tells us about his use of a temenos, a ludic space:


The specific preparations begin when I enter the temenos, the play space. In ancient Greek thought, the temenos is a magic circle, a delimited sacred space within which special rules apply and in which extraordinary events are free to occur. My studio, or whatever space I work in, is a laboratory in which I experiment with my own consciousness. To prepare the temenos—to clear it, rearrange it, take extraneous objects out—is to clean and clear mind and body.


(Free Play, p. 75, my emphasis)


He goes on to add that in situations of live performance he treats the stage or the whole theatre as temenos.


There are those, surely, who wouldn't let philosophical discussion anywhere near a magic circle. However, if philosophy is to allow for experimentation, play without fear, then any objection to thinking within the magic circle would risk seeming picayune. On the other hand why not bring magic under the microscope? Are there words that would undo magic? Magic words?

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posted by Fido the Yak at 2:59 PM. 12 comments

Thursday, July 09, 2009

From this Empty Space

Nachmanovitch writes of the physicality of playing his instrument, the violin: "I found that concentrating on body, gravity, balance, technique&mdashthe physicality of the instrument&mdashleft room for inspiration to sneak in unimpeded. From this empty space came all my subsequent adventures in improvisation" (p. 65). Just a quick question: What space is there between the physicality of the instrument and the physicality of the body?

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posted by Fido the Yak at 3:15 AM. 0 comments

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Galumphing

Nachmanovitch turns to Winnicott on play:


Like other manifestations of the Muse, the child is the voice of our inner knowing. The first language of this knowing is play. In this light, psychiatrist Donald Winnicott came to clarify the aim of psychological healing as "bringing the patient from a state of not being able to play into a state of being able to play. . . .It is in playing and only in playing that the individual child or adult is able to be creative and to use the whole personality, and it is only in being creative that the individual discovers the self."


(p. 50)


How do we speak the first language of inner knowing? Playfully, creatively. With toys. Making toys of words and things. But if the language would have to be created isn't the knowingness then of the inner knowing thrown up in the air—don't worry, Fido will catch you. Sooner or later Fido will remember having thrown you up into the blue, inner knowing. Galumphing, in the sense anthropologist Stephen Miller attributes to the word. We galumph the whole person into discovery: "Oh, there's something I've thrown up in the air. It kind of looks like me." Now, does one really galumph though without ever letting the limbs touch the ground? Making a toy of our gait, as chimpanzees appear to do. Frequently I find myself talking with my inner chimpanzee. We like to galumph together.

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posted by Fido the Yak at 9:43 AM. 0 comments

Sunday, June 07, 2009

Synapsis of the Muse

"The muse is the living voice, as each of us experiences it, of intuition. Intuition is a synaptic summation, our whole nervous system balancing and combining multivariate complexities in a single flash" (Free Play, pp. 39-40).


The synaptic describes the space between touches, the between that enables touch, that touch means. Touch also means the traversal of that space. How is it that touch is brought into that space, for an instant, that space just for touch?


Over and over we meet with a question of shared experience, a question of how experience could possibly surpass the bounds of self, the returning vibe, even as it reinforces them, harmonizes them, evokes the selfsame vibe. Intuitably the synaptic is musical, replete with sweet voices, musical with repletion. We desire to speak with the sweet voices.


Music for us is the loving voice of intimation, of listening wrapped into itself, repletorially, listening, completely open to the announcement to the world of the world, the world that appears instantly in its announcement, of voices on the street below, rising voices of the unsummed love. We desire to speak with the musical voice. The voice of the muse is instantly recognizable as being other than our own, though it resounds within us and without us, multifariously. We share in its vibrations. Synapsis.

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posted by Fido the Yak at 12:39 AM. 6 comments

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

A Continuous Stream of Emerging Pattern

Nachmanovitch speaks of the improvisor "operating on a continuous stream of emerging pattern" (Free Play, p. 32). He asks:


What, then, is this seemingly endless stream of music, dance, imagery, acting, or speech that comes out of us whenever we let it? To some extent it is the stream of consciousness, a river of memories, fragments of melodies, emotions, fragrances, angers, old loves, fantasies. But we sense something else, beyond the personal, from a source that is both very old and very new. The raw material is a kind of flow–Herakleitos' river of time, or the great Tao, flowing through us, as us. Mysteriously flowing through, unstoppable and unstartable. At its source, it does not appear or disappear, does not increase or decrease, is neither tainted nor pure. We can choose to tap into it or not to tap into it; we can find ourselves unwillingly opened up to it or unwillingly cut off from it. But it's always there.


(ibid.)


Doubt would be a shape latent in the moment, a shape to be released, if only I knew how to talk to the moment. Should I couple doubt to paralysis as if that were a bad thing, a blockage? Should I let it emerge strongly or weakly? Doubt, sweet doubt, I will sing your praises. I as paralysis.

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posted by Fido the Yak at 12:38 PM. 3 comments

Monday, May 25, 2009

I=∫F dt

"Impulse, like improvisation, is not 'just anything'; it is not without structure but is the expression of organic, immanent, self-creating structure" (Nachmanovitch, Free Play, p. 29). The Muse's voice will be heard as meaning and experience become infinitesimally divergent, that is, as they converge. That's one outlook. It's taught as part of an approach to improvisation which asks for, not uncommonly, a relinquishment of self on the part of the improvisor. Nachmanovitch says that the "mysterious factor of surrender, the creative surprise that releases us and opens us up, spontaneously allows something to arise" (p. 30). Not just anything, apparently, but the voice of the Muse. The voice of the Muse, though, represents a tiny bit less of a surprise than just anything. We are in truth being asked to surrender a tiny bit less of ourselves than we pretend. Our supplication isn't as supple as it could be, our openness not completely open. Could this be the condition on which we hear the voice of the Muse? If we wanted to, how would we go about making supplications to openness?

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posted by Fido the Yak at 7:21 AM. 0 comments

Thursday, May 21, 2009

Lila (लीला) with Multiple Subtexts

To extemporize is to surrender–in a single gasp–to both the ephemeral and the forever. To accomplish this paraphrasing of Stephen Nachmanovitch (Free Play: Improvisation in Life and Art, p. 21) I woke from a dream of being washed down stream, swimming against the current, losing strength, being drawn under. I woke with the realization that the stream was me, as in none other than me. Paraphrasing is so integral to my daily routine that I'm almost surprised by how wretched my paraphrases are. In fact my attempts at communication make me violently ill. "Stepping into the unknown can . . . lead to failure, disappointment, rejection, sickness, or death. . . . [W]e play undisguisedly with the fleetingness of our life, with some awareness of our own death" (p. 23). We signify. "Exterior to Time" means we surrender to a single breath, means we can step outside–outside parataxis–and play. We signify, playing the shadows of the paraphrastic. What sensibility is this?


The impromptu accedes to a remoteness from both passage and aporia–gasp#&150;a remoteness always ready (made ready by the impromptu impromptu) for its own remoteness, that is, a remoteness simultaneously born of the impromptu and pregnant with it, carrying the echo of the impromptu, immanent remoteness if you will. Sonorous access to infinition–dunt infinitions, sad to say. . . . Maeiutics and euphoria have yondered off to some other remotion, or other remotions. An imminent remotion.


"[T]o do art only for the high feeling of completion and connectedness in the moment of inspiration would be like making love for the moment of orgasm" (p. 18). He completes his thought: "The work of the improviser is, therefore, to stretch out those momentary flashes, extend them until they merge into the activity of daily life" (p. 19).


Another day passes. I apologize for a David Simon quality to yesterday's negativity, a frustrating, if momentarily gleany, one-sidedness. What I almost wanted to do was to begin anew a critique of the moment, a critique that extemporization prompts in my thinking, though such critique is not entirely foreign to me of course. Nachmanovitch actually says that in improvisation we accept the transient and the eternal. Does this imply that we could somehow say no to both? On the fly? I want to witness the birth of thinking. Do I want to feel it? What feeling accompanies my daily praxes, the rhythm of my play? What feeling is there in the breach?

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posted by Fido the Yak at 11:53 PM. 0 comments

Saturday, November 17, 2007

Improvisation and Creativity

Trombone solo by Chad Bernstein of the South Nine Ensemble:



Benson proposes that improvisation offers a clearer model for understanding historical cultural processes than either creation or discovery (The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, Chapter Two). Benson's broad polemic against creativity is both obtuse and contrary to his expressed interest in phenomenology. The message he means to drive home is that an improvisational model of musical compostition is more "phenomnomelogically accurate" than a model of musical creation and (or because) it provides "a more balanced view of the relation between artist and community–one in which it is actually possible to see the artist as an integral part of the community" (p. 52). Benson's ambition is worthy, but he goes about it the wrong way. The critique he means to make should be directed against a certain ideology of the individual rather than against the creativity of individuals, which cannot be denied even if one chooses as examples, as Benson has, Shakespeare and Mozart. All individuals are creative. Likewise all communities are creative, though not in equal measure. One can imagine a community in which integration of its members amounts to stomping the life out of any florescence of individual creativity or any eccentricity, just as one can imagine a community that values and nurtures creative expression by its individual members to the point of disintegration. To understand how a community relates to artistic expressions by its members one must study the community, its values and its modalities of integration and of dialogue.


Eric Dolphy improvising on "God Bless the Child":



Improvisation, as described by Benson, is an admixture of imitiation and variation (p. 48). In my mind improvisation must also contain an element of spontaneous creativity, as Stephen Nachmanovitch argues (Free Play: Improvisation in Life and Art, more on which later). Cultural histories consist in more than variations on a handful of forms or themes. After Boas (Primitive Art) we might attend to the creation of meanings apart from and in addition to the creation of forms. Forms are recycled and broadly diffused, acquiring different meanings in different cultural contexts. Nonetheless cultural meanings are sometimes more supple than granite, and new forms are in fact created. It always remains possible for an individual to assign meanings creatively, regardless of convention or the opinions of the community at large. That said, a dialogical improvisational model seems more attuned to the creative process than a model of creation ex nihilo. And it seems evident, as Benson argues, that the emphases on originality and authorship are related to an emphasis on the autonomous work, which is limiting to say the least (p. 62). If we set aside an impoverished view of creation as being solely the creation of autonomous works ex nihilo by solitary figures, then we can see improvisational dialogue as a musically creative process, and perhaps the best model at hand for understanding music making in general.

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posted by Fido the Yak at 8:57 AM. 0 comments