I was able to revisit Binswanger's "Dream and Existence" (in Being-in-the-world: Selected Papers of Ludwig Binswanger, trans. Jacob Needleman) and also the original (in Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze von Ludwig Binswanger, Vol 1.). Here's Binswanger's essential argument (the translation is mine, but leans on Needleman):
When, e.g., we speak similarily of a high and a low tower, a high and deep tone, high and low morals, high and downfallen spirits, what's involved here is in no way a linguistic translation from one of these essential spheres to another, but rather a general orientation of meaning which is "distributed" equally among the particular regional spheres, i.e., that contains within it the same particular meanings (spatial, acoustic, intellectual, psychic etc.). Sinking or falling thus represent a general orientation of meaning from over to under which contains a special existential meaning "for" our existence, according to the "ontological existential" of, say, the extending-outward of spatiality, the thrownness of mood, or the explication of understanding. In sudden disappointment we fall from the skies or from the clouds not, as Wundt says, because disappointment or terror represent an "asthenic affect" that manifests itself as a threat to the upright posture as a bodily staggering, stumbling or falling, and thus serves for its part as a real bodily model for a poetic image; rather, language independently grasps in this alleged simile one of the deepest special elements lying within the ontological structure of humankind, the ability to be oriented from above to below, and designates this element as falling.
(pp. 75-76).
So now I know what Binswanger would make of the hypnic jerk. Can't say I find it very satisfying. But it's good to question causal explations of such phenomena. In the case of the hypnic jerk it seems to make sense that the relaxation of the body causes the dream experience of falling. In the case of depression, however, causality seems to work the other way. The emotional state of being down causes the body to be weakened. What then does causilty explain? That it is possible to transfer meaning from one sphere to another? Essentially I feel that the body and mind are one and the same, and in that respect I can take Binswanger's point. But I wonder about this ontological structure of human existence. How could it not be an artefact of human embodiment?
Labels: Binswanger, embodiment, falling
At several points Patočka distances his work from existentialism, by which he means chiefly Heideggerian existentialism. He has two basic critiques: (a) Heidegger's analysis of Mitsein (being-with) is too shallow, and (b) Heidegger's conception of movement into the world as "falling" is negative. Otherwise Patočka does understand his ideas about the personal structure of experience as being ontological in the full sense, as describing the conditions of possibility for forming judgements about what is and what is not. In my view Patočka does qualify as an existentialist on the face of it, but his disagreements with Heidegger are worth exploring.
Patočka's first objection needs little amplification. Many thinkers who have followed Heidegger's path have, while still doing existential phenomenology, placed a greater emphasis on being with others than Heidegger did. Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, for instance. Levinas would present an extreme case. However, Patočka doesn't go so far as Levinas, or, in a sense, he goes farther with his phenomenological analysis and isn't inclined to reject the whole of existential phenomenology on the grounds of this problem of co-existence.
Patočka's second objection seems to be exclusively a problem with Heidegger in particular rather than existentialism, though many thinkers who have been influenced by Heidegger have followed this path. Grassi's "abyss," for example, clearly derives from the theme of groundlessness in Heidegger, though Grassi sees this abyss as having both a positive and a negative aspect.
In Patočka's view, all postures, including postures of repose, relaxation, and meditation require an effort of the same kind that is required to stand upright or to physically move from point A to point B. All are equally efforts. This intuition is one basis of his rejection of the world as fallen according to Heidegger, the other being his strong sense that what is common with others is in actuality integral to what existence does. Does Patočka's view hold water? It seems to be true that, for example, some effort is required to relax, that this too is an orientation rather than a state that we might simply fall into. I'm curious though, what would Patočka make of a phenomenon like the hypnagogic jerk. Isn't this a sign that we do carry with us a fear of falling? Here I'm thinking of Ludwig Binswanger more than Heidegger. Anyway, I'm not sure existence works properly without this possibility of falling. I agree with Patočka's rejection of Heidegger's bias against what is common, but I aslo feel that Binswanger in particular had a keen insight into the negative pole of everything that is implied by the upright posture. This groundless horizon, I'll call it, does it accompany our every movement? Is it negative in itself, or is it too structured with a negative aspect, namely falling, and a positive aspect, say flying. Or what about floating? Have you ever dreamed that you walked on air? I have. What's that about?
Labels: Binswanger, existentialism, falling, Grassi, Heidegger, ontology, Patočka