Lived depth is both meaningful and labile, David Morris tells us (The Sense of Space, hereafter Sense). Morris distinguishes lability from malleability and metamorphosis, and explains that by saying lived depth is labile he means that "it is open to alterations that propagate from within our experience of it, where the kinds of alterations are themselves open to alteration" (p. 19). Among the rudiments of lived depth we can further note plasticity, the unfixity of thresholds, bodily movement, or, better perhaps, dynamic, chiasmic movement. Morris helpfully defines "dynamics": "Dynamics are simply shifts in self-organization; the intrinsic ordering of perception always reflects the interaction of body and environment, and changes to either will, as a matter of course, produce changes in self-organization" (pp. 15-16). As an aside, does sense in movement rehabilitate Sinngebung?
When we make the leap from the givenness of the chiasm to the givenness of the }∅{, now understood as a modality of our acceptance of the chiasmatic and coexistential extraordinaries, our way of accepting wild meanings, even those that may be our own—the flavor of the spasmoreal is everywhere now—then we come to question the givenness of the autopoietic. In what depth does it unfold? Naturally we are imagining a physis that has yet to be studied except in fragmentary, inchoate crossings. Can there be a betweenness that doesn't be tween with(in) an encapsulating space. Possibly a (between)space (s p a c e) of multiplicities: an autopoietic space, let's imagine (}∅{, too, for kicks—of course we ask about its givenness—does the attribute ever give rise to the eidos?).
Intersubjective spatiality: "One's sense of depth and space is not simply rooted in the crossing of one's body and the world, but in the crossing of one's existence and an other's existence" (p. 25). I note a radical difference between our perspectives, Morris' and mine, far more radical than the substitution of the * and its spasmoreal multiplicity of relatioms for the pattern of the X. Morris wants to attend to the grounds of the encounter with the other (p. 28). I'd rather see }∅{ as a condition of the encounter, at least provisionally. I don't know whether the encounter can be grounded without being ground to a halt.
Labels: chiasmus, epoché, flux, Morris, motility, physis, plasticity, spasmoreality, spatiality
11 Comments:
Can you explain, in a more outright conceptual way, the principle or concept of: }∅{ ?
Greetings from the Windy City, where I am visiting.
}∅{ is like an in-cept, yet it emerges discursively as a response to the arche. How does it originate? Autopoietically? Or do we acknowledge that it is a con-cept with the arche? (Like its withness with the empty set.) I talk about }∅{ extemporaneously because the extemporaneous describes it. If you can be in a state of consciousness that includes nothing while excluding nothing then }∅{ can describe such a state of consciousness, or a goal of thinking, a guideline, better. Maybe you'd want it to represent an empty concept, I don't know. I say now the }∅{ expresses the acknowledgment that the explanation never exceeds its explained, which is a way of saying it never accomplishes what it sets out to do, and that "foundation" is a metaphor—you may see why I call it "the breach."
Thanks FtY. No doubt I diverge some from your concept, but this is the train of thought that follows for me from your symbol/in-cept. Much appreciation for the post.
ah, forgot the link: http://kvond.wordpress.com/2009/07/13/%e2%88%85-the-full-set/
Just trying this with a typical irrelevance.
'Proceed very slowly, and take as long a necessary, until you are sure that your feeling corresponds to reality; that is, that other people can recognize in your movements all the mentioned points of importance. You then know how it feels to act correctly. With this gauge, proceed to learn how to get up onto your feet, to stand, to speak, eat, make love, work, excrete, and think.' (Feldenkrais, The Potent Self).
Did you ever come across Evan Thompson's 'Mind in Life: biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind.' This review might be of interest:
http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=12204
I did contact him but smell academic distain. I mentioned a connection btwn his concept prereflective awareness and Crocco/cadacualtez.
Also stumbled across an article by Stengers 'Diderot's Egg' which you and k might like:
http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/pdf/highlight144.pdf
You may remember, Paul, I started reading Mind in Life on interlibrary loan but ran out of time to read it through. Never bothered to follow up.
Stengers' essay really strikes a chord.
kvond, I appreciate your interest as well.
Can we define set in such a way that }∅{ or something like it wouldn't be paradoxical?
The syntax of bracketing: if bracketing has a syntax that can be confuted, confounded or breached, then does that tell us anything useful about the nature of the bracket? How does the bracket say?
FtY,
Yes, the term "set" has to be taken in a somewhat paradoxical fashion in at least my notion of Full Set (which is not reducible to the immanent multiplicity within bounds {∞}. If you wish,}∅{ is the kind of syntax of syntax, its precondition, such that one must appreciate the any bracketed construction necessarily is both insufficient, but also nestled without gap to any number of determiative ones, infinitely broadening one's scope. In this sense }∅{ lies infinitesmally between the outer bounds of brackets, but also comprensively throughout and beyond them. It is what generates them. In many quarters this is simply called "God" and makes something of an ontological proof.
Hmm, this is hard for me to follow but perhaps there is connection with Whitehead's necessity for a concept of 'god' in his cosmology - that which actualizes...
Stengers on Whitehead in Montreal:
http://www.mcgill.ca/files/hpsc/Whitmontreal.pdf
In the same way, it is not because of religious reasons that Whitehead introduced a
God in his philosophy, but because he needed it in order for his metaphysics to communicate
with a cosmology. He needed God because without a God, his metaphysical categories where
able to describe an actual entity including in its own becoming an eternal object already realized
in an other actual entity, but not that new unrealized eternal object would ingress and
produce relevant novelty, turning a contradiction into a contrast. “Apart from the intervention
of God, there could be nothing new in the world, and no order in the world. The course of
creation would be a dead level of ineffectiveness, with all balance and intensity progressively
excluded by the cross-currents of incompatibility.” (PR, 247)
It is important to emphasize that Whitehead’s God is a metaphysical concept, that is a
concept which is relevant only when we deal with actual entities. God is not to be the source
of social order, be it one which is exemplified by physical laws or by moral habits. God’s
functioning has to do with actual entities alone, or, more precisely, with the envisagement of
each new entity as an opportunity for a slightly original becoming.
Thus we cannot metaphysically speak about a God listening to a prayer, only about a
God participating in the intense adventure that is a prayer. God has no power to rule, to explain
or even to know what will happen. God is needed as envisagement of each new actual
entity as what maybe could escape the impasse of already settled modes of determination, and
maybe produce relevant novelty. This is why Whitehead wrote the “function of God is analogous
to the remorseless working of things in Greek and in Buddhist thought. The initial aim is
the best for that impasse. But if the best be bad, then the ruthlessness of God can be personified
as Ate, the goddess of mischief.” ( PR, 244)
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