If Gadamer is right that every assertion is in answer to a question, what question does the nonassertion of the breach (}∅{) refuse to answer? One should interpret with caution the answer to any question issued with a command (arche). Even the refusal to answer a question posed under such conditions becomes suspect. The nonassertion of the breach could simply be a refusal of the conditions of the question's formulation. Working backwards, though, can we discern whether the nonassertion of the breach refuses anything besides a command to answer, such as any kind of question that we should like to take up, even to explicitly refuse, if only it were properly formulated? One reacts to the postulation of ultimacy (and its substitutes, which give us a reason for not saying "ultimacies"), weighs it against, perhaps, an ethos of nonauthoritarian thinking, an existential obligation to create one's response to the world. On which side of the postulated question does epagoge fall? In sticking to the breach, I won't surrender epagoge. Not just yet. In the breach the not-just-yet is not at odds with epagoge. Go figure.
Labels: Aristotle, Gadamer, improvisation, induction, questions
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