Fido the Yak

Deleuze wraps up his discussion of the actualization of the virtual:

Actualisation takes place in three series: space, time and also consciousness. Every spatio-temporal dynamism is accompanied by the emergence of an elementary consciousness which itself traces directions, doubles movements and migrations, and is born on the threshold of the condensed singularities of the body or object whose consciousness it is. It is not enough to say that consciousness is consciousness of something: it is the double of this something, and everything is consciousness because it possesses a double, even if it is far off and very foreign. Repetition is everywhere, as much as in what is actualised as in its actualisation. It is in the Idea to begin with, and it runs through the varieties of relations and the distribution of singular points. It also determines the reproductions of space and time, as it does the reprises of consciousness.

(Difference and Repetition, p. 220, emphasis mine)

Sinthome recently posted a very good explanation of how Deleuze's account of individuation underlies his thinking about learning and Ideas, which I think is helpful in grasping what Deleuze means by the sentence that I've emphasized. There is yet another implication which I'd like to explore. Speaking of conceptual blockage, Deleuze asks provocatively "who blocks the concept, if not the Idea?" (p. 220, emphasis Deleuze's). I take it to be Deleuze's position that the who of the idea is not an identity. Does this make sense? What sort of who can we mean when speaking of the who of the idea?

Labels: consciousness, Deleuze, ideas, intentionality, larval subjects, panpsychism, repetition

posted by Fido the Yak at 12:50 PM.