Fido the Yak

Marion writes:

[T]he duality of the term "phenomenon" constitutes, paradoxically, the fundamental achievement of Husserlian phenomenology: the term "phenomenon" does not apply first, nor only, to the object that appears, but indeed to the lived experience in which and according to which it appears; this duality alone will allow one to think of absolute givenness, intentionality, and the couple of noesis/noema. Even and especially if one takes intentionality into account, Erscheinung is approached on the basis of the immanence of Erlebnis–and therefore, inevitably, never on the basis of the appearing of the object itself, which is by definition conditioned.

(Reduction and Givenness, p. 53)

This puts into a new light the question of whether being is encountered as a phenomenon, though I reckon there was in the question already a glimmer of the problem of intentionality. I wonder, does this notion of the phenomenon as lived experience entail an opaqueness that is not evident when one considers the appearing of an object? Marion, however, doesn't read Husserl this way. For him the lived experience of the phenomenon is a kind of flattening, a flattening into the present. I see this notion of phenomenon as lived experience as inherently enigmatic regardless of what Marion (or Husserl for that matter) says about it. I'm not seeing Marion's case for having to pass through Heidegger in order to deeply question phenomenality as such.

Labels: experience, Husserl, Marion, phenomenology

posted by Fido the Yak at 3:09 PM.