Wednesday, November 15, 2006

Before Intentionality

Nancy says:

Before phenomenological intentionality and the constitution of the ego, but also before thinglike consistency as such, there is co-oringarity according to the with. Properly speaking, then. there is no anteriority: co-originarity is the most general structure of all con-sistency, all con-stitution, and all con-sciousness.

(Being singular plural, pp. 40-41)

Isn't this exactly the problem of the lifeworld in Husselian phenomenology? Is it a solution? Nancy's "problem of the city" (p.35) goes directly to the heart of the matter of coexistence. The coevality of what exists upsets the privileged position of the transcendental ego. On what basis do we understand the coeveality of existence? Nancy suggests ethical and experiential grounds for accepting coevality, but the core of his argument is an appeal to reason: How can one be counted unless more exist to be counted?

Assuming Nancy's reasoning about the singular plural is correct, does it follow that the "with" of being is (logically) prior to intentionality? Can being-with not be being-with-something? What does the doctrine of intentionality make of indefiniteness in general? Are there limits to the open-endedness of coexistence? If so, where would those come from?

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posted by Fido the Yak at 9:21 AM.


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